Santa Clara Law

Santa Clara Law Digital Commons
Faculty Publications

Faculty Scholarship

9-1-2013

When Does Freedom of Speech Trump Celebrity
Publicity Rights?
Tyler T. Ochoa
Santa Clara University School of Law, ttochoa@scu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
14 Internet L. & Bus. 329 (2013)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.

September 2013

INTERNET LAW & BUSINESS

14 ILB 329

When Does Freedom of Speech Trump Celebrity Publicity Rights?
by
Tyler Ochoa*

The use of college athletes’ likenesses in sportssimulation videogames, such as Electronic Arts’
NCAA Football series, has spawned a number of
lawsuits alleging that such use violates the athletes’
rights of publicity. (These actions have been brought
by retired college athletes, as the NCAA prohibits
college athletes from commercially exploiting their
rights of publicity while in college, as a condition
of maintaining their “amateur” status.) Two federal
Courts of Appeals have now held 2-1 that the First
Amendment does not protect Electronic Arts’ depiction of actual college players, so that EA may be
held liable under state right of publicity laws. The
agreement between the two courts makes it considerably less likely that the Supreme Court will review either one of the cases when it resumes sitting
in October.
EA’s NCAA Football game strives for realism
and has achieved it to a large degree. The in-game
stadiums depicted look like the actual stadiums on
college campuses; and the players for each team are
modeled on the actual players who played for that
team during the year depicted. Each in-game player has the same uniform number, height, weight, attributes, and home town as the actual players. EA
does not use any names, in order to comply with
its licensing agreement with the NCAA, in which it
agrees not to use any actual players; but it is common for users to upload the names of the players
from third-party sources. EA also provides players with the ability to “customize” any player on
the roster, so that the user can change the players’
height, weight, and other attributes. Want to insert
yourself as quarterback of your favorite team? Go
right ahead.
In Hart v. Electronic Arts, 717 F.3d 141 (3rd Cir.
2013), decided two months ago, [available at http://
www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/113750p.pdf ]
former Rutgers quarterback Ryan Hart sued EA for
using his likeness in its videogame. As there is no
* Tyler Ochoa is Professor of Law at Santa Clara Law
School. This article originally appeared as a blog post on the
Technology & Marketing Law Blog (blog.ericgoldman.com).
Used with permission.

real doubt that the player depicted was meant to be
Hart, the prima facie case for liability was pretty
straightforward: EA used players’ likenesses in a
product for commercial gain. The only significant
question on summary judgment was whether EA’s
depiction is protected by the First Amendment. The
District Court held that the videogame was protected by the First Amendment, a ruling that the Third
Circuit panel reversed.

Similarly, in Keller v. Electronic Arts, No.
10-15387 (9th Cir. July 31, 2013), [available
at
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2013/07/31/10-15387.pdf ] there was no real
doubt that the player depicted was meant to be former Arizona State and Nebraska quarterback Sam
Keller. The Keller case was consolidated with a
similar suit filed by former UCLA basketball player
Ed O’Bannon and several others, which also challenged the NCAA’s restriction against players exploiting their rights of publicity while in college as
an antitrust violation. (Only the First Amendment
issue was decided in this opinion; the antitrust issue
remains pending. Probably as a result, the NCAA
has announced that it will no longer license EA after the forthcoming 2014 game, leaving individual
colleges and universities to strike their own deals
with EA. EA has already signed an extension with
the Collegiate Licensing Company, which controls
trademark licensing for a large number of colleges
and universities.)
Keller also involved a significant procedural
complication. The First Amendment issue was
raised not in a motion for summary judgment, but
in a special motion to strike under California’s antiSLAPP law. SLAPP is an acronym for “strategic
lawsuits against public participation,” and such
statutes are “designed to discourage suits that masquerade as ordinary lawsuits but are brought to deter common citizens from exercising their political
or legal rights or to punish them for doing so [citation omitted].” California law allows a defendant
in such a case to raise the First Amendment issue
at the outset of the case, using a special motion to
strike. The standard, however, is lenient: although
the statute requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that
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it has a “reasonable probability” that it will prevail,
courts have watered down the statute by interpreting
it as allowing the lawsuit to proceed unless the defendant would prevail under the First Amendment
as a matter of law. Applying this standard, the district court held that EA was not protected by the
First Amendment as a matter of law, and the Ninth
Circuit affirmed. Thus, EA could theoretically still
prevail at trial if the trier of fact found certain facts
(discussed below) in its favor; but as a practical
matter, the Ninth Circuit’s opinion is unlikely to be
contradicted.
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Enquirer, 123 F.3d 1249 (9th Cir. 1997). Bizarrely,
the same standard was used in a case in which
Dustin Hoffman claimed that his likeness was used
without permission in an article in L.A. Magazine,
in which a still photograph of Hoffman in drag from
the movie “Tootsie” was altered by superimposing
another model’s body wearing a different dress,
despite the fact that all parties agreed that L.A.
Magazine did not try to “pass off” the photograph
as real. Indeed, the whole point of the story was
to show famous scenes featuring Hollywood icons,
digitally altered to wear modern fashion styles. The
Ninth Circuit held that the magazine article was
Background: Competing First Amendment Standards
protected by re-interpreting the test to inquire not
An important question is what First Amendment whether the magazine knew that the depiction was
analysis will be used in such lawsuits. Courts fac- false, but whether it had knowingly (and falsely)
ing First Amendment questions in right of public- represented either that it was true, or that Hoffman
ity cases have set forth a large variety of different had consented (finding a lack of evidence on both
analyses. In the only U.S. Supreme Court opinion counts). Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255
to date, the Court held that the First Amendment F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001).
“do[es] not immunize the media when they broadIn a notorious case, game show hostess Vanna
cast a performer’s entire act without his consent.”
White sued Samsung for an advertisement that
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433
depicted a robot in a blonde wig and evening
U.S. 562 (1977). That case involved a 15-second
gown, turning letters on a Wheel-of-Fortune game
clip of a human cannonball at a local county fair,
board. Because the ad was “commercial speech,”
shown on the local TV station’s news broadcast.
a majority of the Ninth Circuit panel gave the First
Unfortunately, the Court did not set forth any sort
Amendment argument short shrift, dismissing
of general approach to deciding claims of this type,
it in a single short paragraph. White v. Samsung
leaving lower courts to sort out the issues in later
Electronics America, Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir.
cases. In particular, the Court did not adopt (or
1992). White was subsequently awarded $400,000
even refer to) either the “strict scrutiny” analysis
in damages. Judge Kozinski’s opinion dissenting
typically used for content-based restrictions or the
from the denial of rehearing en banc, arguing from
“intermediate scrutiny” analysis typically used
stronger First Amendment protection, has become
for content-neutral restrictions that implicate First
a staple of law-school casebooks. 989 F.2d 1512
Amendment interests. Interestingly, lower courts
(9th Cir. 1993). White is arguably inconsistent with
have declined to adopt either of these more general
the later U.S. Supreme Court decision in Campbell
standards as well, and instead have largely preferred
v. Acuff-Rose, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994), which
to use standards that are unique to the intellectual
held that an alleged rap parody of the popular song
property context.
Pretty Woman could qualify as a parody protected
In two cases involving Clint Eastwood and the by the copyright fair use doctrine. Moreover, in a
National Enquirer, in which Eastwood alleged that later case involving parody baseball cards, the Tenth
the tabloid knowingly printed false stories about Circuit expressly disagreed with White, holding that
him and advertised them on its cover in order to in- the First Amendment protected lampoons of active
crease its circulation, courts have used the familiar professional baseball players (such as the depicstandard from libel law, first set forth in New York tion of slugger Barry Bonds as “Treasury Bonds”).
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), under which Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players
a publisher may not be held liable for mere negli- Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996). There, the
gence in printing a false story about a public figure, Court systematically analyzed the effect of a hypobut may only have damages imposed if it acted with thetical injunction on the right of free speech, and
“actual malice,” that is, if it knew the story was false balanced it against the effect of a hypothetical rulor if it acted with reckless disregard as to its falsity. ing against the players on the right of publicity. The
Eastwood v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d 409, court examined seven rationales advanced for the
198 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1983); Eastwood v. National right of publicity, and found either that each was
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unpersuasive or that it would not be significantly that the First Amendment interest was outweighed
advanced by a ruling in favor of the players.
by the right of publicity unless the use was “transIn Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. formative,” a term borrowed from the copyright
1989), actress Ginger Rogers sued the produc- “fair use” doctrine. “When artistic expression takes
ers of a movie entitled “Ginger and Fred,” about the form of a literal depiction or imitation of a cea fictional pair of Italian dancers who were com- lebrity for commercial gain, . . . the state interest in
pared to Rogers and Astaire and acquired the nick- protecting the fruits of artistic labor outweighs the
names “Ginger and Fred.” Her suit was based on expressive interests of the imitative artist. On the
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act (false endorse- other hand, when a work contains significant transment) as well as Oregon right of publicity. The formative elements, . . . First Amendment protecSecond Circuit rejected a proposed standard drawn tion of such works outweighs whatever interest the
from a real property case, Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, state may have in enforcing the right of publicity.”
407 U.S. 551 (1972), in which the court held that The Saderup court added two additional inquiries.
the First Amendment did not require states to allow “Another way of stating the inquiry is whether the
distribution of handbills on private property unless celebrity likeness is one of the ‘raw materials’ from
there were “no alternative avenues of expression.” which an original work is synthesized, or whethInstead, the Second Circuit held that the Lanham er the depiction or imitation of the celebrity is the
Act was outweighed by the First Amendment “un- very sum and substance of the work in question.
less the title has no artistic relevance to the under- . . . Furthermore, in determine whether a work is
lying work whatsoever, or, if it has some artistic sufficiently transformative, courts may find useful
relevance, unless the title explicitly misleads as to a subsidiary inquiry . . .: does the marketability and
the source or the content of the work.” The court economic value of the challenged work derive priapplied a similar standard to the right of publicity marily from the fame of the celebrity depicted . . .
claim, holding that the First Amendment prevailed [or] from the creativity, skill, and reputation of the
“unless the title was wholly unrelated to the movie artist[?]”
or was simply a disguised commercial advertisement for the sale of goods or services.” Both the
Second Circuit and the Ninth Circuit have subsequently expanded the reach of the Rogers test to
the use of trademarks in the content of expressive
works. Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday,
Inc., 886 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1989); Mattel, Inc. v.
MCA Records, 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002); E.S.S.
Entertainment, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547
F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2008). The Rogers test is very
protective of free speech. The only appellate case
in which the defendant failed to satisfy the Rogers
standard is Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437
(6th Cir. 2003), in which Rosa Parks successfully
sued over the use of her name as the title of a rap
song which used the phrase “Everybody move to
the back of the bus,” but not as a reference to segregation. The court held that the song was “wholly
unrelated” to the civil rights icon.
Two cases involving works of art introduced two
additional First Amendment analyses. In Comedy
III Prods v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 25 Cal. 4th 387, 106
Cal. Rptr. 2d 126 (2001), the California Supreme
Court held that reproductions of a charcoal drawing of the Three Stooges were not protected by the
First Amendment. Despite rejecting six proffered
reasons why the lithographs and t-shirts might not
be protected by the First Amendment, the court held

In ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc., 332 F.3d
915 (6th Cir. 2003), however, the Sixth Circuit held
that reproductions of a painting of Tiger Woods
winning the 1997 Masters golf tournament were
protected by the First Amendment. The court found
that the Saderup “transformative” standard was satisfied; but it also applied the Rogers v. Grimaldi
standard, and a third standard, taken from the
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, § 47,
cmt. c, which states that “the use of a person’s identity primarily for the purpose of communicating
information or expressing ideas is not generally actionable as a violation of the person’s right of publicity,” unless the name or likeness is used solely to
attract attention to a work that is not related to the
identified person, or if the work contains substantial
falsifications. In a meandering opinion, the Court
held that the poster was protected under any of the
three standards.
Cases involving the use of real people as models
for comic-book characters have also reached divergent results. In Winter v. DC Comics, 30 Cal. 4th
881, 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d 634 (2003), singers Johnny
and Edgar Winter were depicted in a Jonah Hex
comic book series as “Johnny and Edgar Autumn,”
two half-worm, half-human villains, or “vile, depraved, stupid, cowardly, subhuman individuals
who engage in wanton acts of violence, murder and
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bestiality for pleasure and who should be killed.”
The California Supreme Court unanimously held
that the comic book met the “transformative”
standard of Saderup and was protected by the
First Amendment. But when hockey player Tony
Twist’s name was used by writer Todd McFarlane
as the name of a Mafia don in the comic book series Spawn, the Missouri Supreme Court rejected
both the Restatement and the “transformative”
standard, adopting instead a “predominant use” test
(proposed by a prominent right-of-publicity plaintiff’s attorney in a law review article), which looks
at whether the product “predominantly exploits the
commercial value of an individual’s identity, . . .
even if there is some ‘expressive’ content in it that
might qualify as ‘speech’ in other circumstances.”
Doe v. TCI Cablevision, Inc., 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo.
2003). [McFarlane was significantly damaged by
his apparent attempt to ward off a defamation claim
by claiming that his Mafia don was not a comment
on the real Tony Twist, and by the fact that he occasionally marketed Spawn and related merchandise
to hockey fans.] Not surprisingly, given its origin,
this standard is most protective of celebrities and
most hostile to free speech.
Choosing a Standard

So, which of these competing standards should
be used in the videogame cases? Both Cardtoons
and White are pretty clearly limited to parody cases,
and Eastwood is pretty clearly limited to false news
reports masquerading as true (despite the Hoffman
departure). That still leaves three (or four) standards: Rogers, the Restatement standard (to the
extent it differs), the Saderup “transformative”
standard, and the Doe “predominant use” standard.
The Hart opinion criticized the “predominant
use” test as “subjective at best, arbitrary at worst,”
and for requiring courts “to analyze select elements
of a work to determine how much they contribute
to the entire work’s expressiveness.” Moreover, the
court said, adopting this test “would suppose that
there exists a broad range of seemingly expressive
speech that has no First Amendment value.”
Both Hart and Keller rejected application of the
Rogers test. The Hart court was concerned that the
Rogers test was “a blunt instrument, unfit for widespread application in cases that require carefully
calibrated balancing,” and suggested that “adopting this test would potentially immunize a broad
swath of tortious activity.” In particular, the court
was concerned that the “wholly unrelated” standard would be easily met by any product targeted

14 ILB 332

at sports fans. “It cannot be that the very activity
by which [Hart] achieved his renown now prevents
him from protecting his hard-won celebrity.”

Both Hart and Keller suggested that the Sixth
Circuit’s use of Rogers in the Parks case was less
persuasive because the same court, in deciding
ETW a few months later, did not clearly use Rogers,
but also relied on the Restatement and Saderup.
However, both courts also indicated that the Rogers
standard should continue to be applied to false endorsement cases brought under the Lanham Act.
Indeed, the Ninth Circuit so held in a companion
case brought by former professional football player
Jim Brown, in which the state-law right of publicity
claims were dismissed for lack of diversity jurisdiction after the federal Lanham Act claim was decided.” Brown v. Electronic Arts, No. 09-56675 (9th Cir.
July 31, 2013) [available at http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.
gov/datastore/opinions/2013/07/31/09-56675.pdf ]
The Keller court noted that Rogers was designed
“to protect consumers against the risk of consumer
confusion — the hallmark element of a Lanham
Act claim,” whereas “[t]he right of publicity protects the celebrity, not the consumer,” and does not
require any showing of confusion.
This double standard makes little sense. Serving
the public interest by protecting against consumer
confusion should be a stronger, more compelling
government interest than protecting the purely
private interest of the celebrity, yet both courts
would apply a much more speech-protective First
Amendment standard in cases involving the former
interest than in cases involving the latter. Moreover,
in Rogers itself, the Second Circuit applied a nearly-identical analysis to the right of publicity claim
as it did to the Lanham Act claim. Yet Keller says
that it did so only because “Oregon courts . . . [had]
not determined the scope of the common-law right
of publicity in that state,” whereas four California
courts have already applied the Saderup “transformative” standard. Thus, the Keller court bizarrely
suggests that the Rogers “wholly unrelated” standard was merely a federal court’s Erie prediction
about a matter of state tort law, rather than a federal
First Amendment limitation on state tort law.

Instead, both Hart and Keller applied the
Saderup “transformative” standard. The Keller
court did so essentially by default, whereas the Hart
court said that the “transformative” standard “appears to strike the best balance because it provides
courts with a flexible — yet uniformly applicable
— analytical framework,” and because it thought it
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was consistent with most of the previously decided the EA videogame itself. Surely the fact that EA’s
avatars are capable of being modified to represent
cases.
people of different height, weight, ethnicity, etc.,
Applying the Standard
cannot itself be a basis for liability.)
A fundamental question when applying the
Not surprisingly, given this narrow focus on the
Saderup standard is: what is it that has to be “trans- avatars themselves and discounting all of the other
formative”? Does the celebrity likeness itself have contributions of EA’s artists and programmers, inbe “transformative”? Or is it sufficient if the work cluding the ability of users to alter the avatars, both
as a whole is “transformative”? Saderup itself courts held that the avatars were not transformative,
consistently indicates that the inquiry is whether and therefore they were not protected by the First
the “work” is transformative. [That is also true in Amendment. In both cases, however, one of the
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, the U.S. Supreme three judges dissented on exactly these two issues:
Court case discussing the copyright fair use doc- that in deciding whether the works were “transfortrine from which the California Supreme Court bor- mative,” the court should consider the game as a
rowed the “transformative” inquiry.] Yet both Hart whole, and especially the ability of users to alter the
and Keller hold instead that what matters is wheth- avatars to their own liking.
er the depiction of the celebrity is transformative,
A further irony is that all of the attributes that
rather than the work as a whole. Instead of look“identify”
the football players: their numbers, poing to Saderup, Keller instead relied on a California
sitions,
height,
weight, ethnicity, hometown, etc.,
Court of Appeal case, No Doubt v. Activision
and
all
of
the
statistics
on which the “random” alPublishing, 192 Cal. App. 4th 1018, 122 Cal. Rptr.
gorithms
controlling
the
videogame are based, are
3d 397 (2011), in which a rock band successfully
publicly
available
information.
The Eight Circuit
sued the makers of the videogame Band Hero, for
has
already
held
that
the
use
of
such
publicly availincluding avatars of the band members in a videoable
information
in
providing
commercial
fantasy
game that allowed those avatars to perform songs
sports
products
to
the
public
is
protected
by the
other than those made popular by the band, a flexFirst
Amendment.
C.B.C.
Distrib.
&
Mktg.,
Inc.
ibility that exceeded the scope of the license that
v.
Major
League
Baseball
Advanced
Media,
L.P.,
the band members had granted. The Keller court
thus (somewhat strangely) abdicated its role as a 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007). The only difference
federal court to construe federal law, and instead between using statistics to run a fantasy football
deferred to a state court’s view of federal law. The game and using statistics to run a fantasy football
Hart court also relied on No Doubt, but it further videogame is the visual element. Essentially, the
justified its decision on the ground that otherwise, court holds that the visual element — the depiction
“[a]cts of blatant misappropriation would count for of a body type similar to a celebrity, imitating the
nothing so long as the larger work, on balance, con- celebrity — is enough to take the game out of realm
tained contained highly creative elements in great of fully protected speech and to put it into the same
category with plastic action figures, coffee mugs,
abundance.”
and other celebrity merchandise. If taken literally,
A further question is: of what significance it is the opinions in Hart and Keller could be read to bar
that avatars can be altered by the users? This fact the literal depiction of a celebrity in a work of hispotentially distinguishes Hart and Keller from No torical fiction, such as Forrest Gump, or a “docudraDoubt, in which the court specifically noted that the ma” such as the movie 42 (about Jackie Robinson).
avatars could not be altered. Nonetheless, the Hart I am confident that this will not come to pass, and
court held that the ability to alter avatars was not that courts will continue to give First Amendment
material, because the realism associated with real protection to depictions of real people in “traditionplayers was an important factor in getting consum- al” entertainment media, such as movies and televiers to buy the product. This reasoning suggests a sion, even when lightly (or heavily) fictionalized.
possible work-around, in which EA distributes the See, e.g., Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods.,
game with “generic” avatars at each position, and 25 Cal. 3d 860, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1979) (ficlets users modify the avatars themselves. (There is tional movie about Rudolf Valentino); Tyne v. Time
little doubt that a market for user-generated content Warner Entertainment Co., 901 So.2d 802 (Fla.
supplying the various “attributes” would immedi- 2005) (suit by heirs of the fisherman depicted in the
ately arise, but then litigation might have to be di- movie The Perfect Storm); Ruffin-Steinback v. derected at the suppliers of such content, rather than at Passe, 267 F.3d 457 (6th Cir. 2001) (TV miniseries
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about singing group The Temptations). But the fact
that courts cannot yet articulate a consistent First
Amendment standard that distinguishes between
the literal depiction of a celebrity in a sports-simulation videogame and the literal depiction of a celebrity in a more traditional work of entertainment
strongly suggests that courts simply do not place
the same value on the videogame medium as they
do on more traditional media. For a extensive rebuttal to this apparent discrimination, see William
K. Ford and Raizel Liebler, Games Are Not Coffee
Mugs: Games and the Right of Publicity, 29 Santa
Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 1 (2012) [available at http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj/
vol29/iss1/1 ]
Although there was a split at the district court
level, the fact that both the Third Circuit and the
Ninth Circuit reached the same result, using almost
the same reasoning, significantly decreases the likelihood that the U.S. Supreme Court will grant review. That possibility is further diminished by the
procedural posture of the Keller case: the Supreme
Court prefers to review final judgments, rather than
intermediate rulings in cases in which significant
court proceedings are still to come. EA would be
better off filing a petition for rehearing en banc in
the Keller case. (It has already filed such a petition
in Hart).   Only two Ninth Circuit judges voted in
the Keller case, and they split on the result. The deciding vote was cast by a Senior U.S. District Judge
from the Western District of Michigan, sitting by
designation. (Senior Ninth Circuit Judge Tashima
formed part of the majority in Hart while sitting by
designation on the Third Circuit, but judges with
senior status are not eligible to vote on petitions for
rehearing.) If a majority of the 27 active judges
of the Ninth Circuit vote to grant review, the case
would be reheard by a panel of 11 judges, including
Chief Judge Alex Kozinski, a videogame aficionado who has twice previously expressed support for
a robust First Amendment test in right of publicity cases, and who used the Rogers standard in his
opinion in Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, 296 F.3d
894 (9th Cir. 2002). If either en banc court were to
reach a different result, then the parties would have
a much better chance of getting the U.S. Supreme
Court to review the case.
* * *
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